Non-Linear Growth

A glimpse around the next corner; mind the curves.

When Expectations Converge

Yesterday, I posted on a VentureBeat piece covering the correlation between exit market conditions and venture capital company-building behaviour and philosophy; or lack thereof. The piece called for a back-to basics approach to venture capital, where investors are focused true partnering with entrepreneurs to build fundamental value over a traditional investment horizon (5-7 years).

In today’s post, I wanted to tackle the flip side of this issue; the notion that exit markets and general public equity market conditions also have an impact on venture investor investing behaviour. In my opinion, there are three things required for a healthful level of new venture investment activity; liquidity, valuation stability and convergence of expectations

Liquidity

Venture investors fundamentally sell two things; money and expertise in helping the real heros – entrepreneurs – create value. But in order to “sell” money, we have to “buy” money. By by money, I mean we have to fundraise and create a committed pool of capital to invest; a fund. If VCs can’t buy money, we can’t sell money. And right now, many VCs can’t buy money at any price. There are many reasons for this, although I won’t digress into those issues here. Suffice to say, the number of venture funds and venture capitalists is shrinking. And as funds move past their initial investment period, there is less and less liquidity in the market. In the end, this is healthy as many have made the case that the venture asset class has been over-capitalized. But regardless, if there is less capital available to venture funds, there will be less capital available to emerging growth companies.

Valuation Stability

The best proxy for valuation stability is public equity markets. Anyone who has been paying attention in the least knows we’ve had an extremely volatile twelve months. Venture investors don’t like investing in falling markets. Some refer to this as the phenomenon of “catching a falling knife”; not something you want to try, you might get cut. Point being, an investor can look “stupid” for making an investment at a valuation that is cut in half in six months by a falling public equity market. This affects the early stage less than growth and later stage deals, because there is a floor on valuation; you can’t go lower than zero. Early stage deals; particularly Series A rounds simply have less far to fall than their growth and later stage brethren. But when a business can be valued on metrics; multiples of EBITDA, revenue, subscribers, etc., as growth and later stage deals can, new investment activity comes to a screeching halt in falling markets.

The flip side often occurs in rising markets, entrepreneurs think valuations are going to continue to go up and they try to price their deals to implied future valuations as if the market were guaranteed to go up. Point being, both falling and rapidly rising public equity markets can impede new investment activity.

Convergence of Expectations

The final requirement is a convergence of valuation expectations. When markets have recently fallen, investors adjust their valuation requirements down faster than entrepreneurs. And when markets have recently risen, entrepreneurs adjust their expectations down faster than investors. After a down market, entrepreneurs may “wait it out”, refusing to come to grips with the new valuation reality. And in an overvalued or over-bought market, investors may “wait it out” waiting for the bubble to burst or a correction. Again, this applies more to growth and later stage deals than to the early stage, although all stages are affected to some degree.

So where are we now?

I don’t know, but I do have an opinion; no surprise right. I think we’re entering a period of significant deal activity. There is a low, but appropriate level of liquidity in the venture asset class. We’ve come through one of the biggest stock market corrections in history and are now up greater than 50% from the bottom on all the major market indices. Valuations are stabilizing. Entrepreneurs have had the time to adjust to the new valuation realities and investors don’t have an argument that they are either catching a falling knife or that we’re in a bubble. It all sets the tone for a reasonable and balanced valuation discussion between investors and entrepreneurs.

I for one am glad to have a new fund to invest in this environment. I think it is going to be a great time to invest and to build strong, growing and profitable operating companies that can stand-alone for years to come.

Filed under: New Investments, Risk, Venture Capital, , , ,

Why VCs Need to Create Value

VentureBeat’s Entrepreneur Corner has a must read post today on the recent history of the Venture Capital business model. Every entrepreneur should read this, particularly those looking to raise venture capital and in the enviable position of being able to select the right investor for their company.

The author, Steve Blank, walks the reader through four distinct exit market cycles and discusses venture capital behaviour and philosophy in the context of those market cycles. The title of the article is a bit misleading as it posits whether or not you can trust VCs under 40. I’ll return to that later; suffice to say for now that it is one of those titles intended to stir controversy, but not fundamentally of value. 

The first cycle Blank covers is the 80s and 90s, where exit markets, particularly the public equity market required five quarters of profitability. As Blank states, the implications for venture investors during that period of time were clear:

What this meant for entrepreneurs and VCs was simple and profound – and is entirely underappreciated today: VCs worked with entrepreneurs to build profitable and scalable businesses. In this time, a successful business was one that had paying customers quarter after quarter, not one that was flipped or hyped to the market despite a lack of earnings or revenue.

Venture Capitalists on the board brought a firm their expertise to build long-term sustainable companies. They taught companies about customers, markets and profits.

Blank then goes into detail on two subsequent phases. The “IPO Bubble” (August 1995-March 2000) and the “Rise of Mergers and Acquisitions” (March 2003 – 2008). In each phase he articulates the warping effect of these markets on VC behaviour. In both phases, he makes the basic point that VCs were building companies to be sold prematurely to a greater fool; either into an overvalued IPO market or to a frothy strategic acquirer. The notion that stable revenues and profits were a key part of the formula for a successful exit was still missing. One might refer to this as “momentum” investing.

Back to the Future

And finally, Blank makes the case that 2009 will be a back to the future period where VCs will have to return to the fundamentals of building real value in their portfolio companies in order to generate meaningful returns for their investors. I think Blank is dead on here.

But I’m here to say that some of us never left the approach of working with entrepreneurs to create fundamentally valuable operating companies. My Partners and I at Meritagebelieve that venture capitalists have to work with entrepreneurs to create fundamental value. This core belief is the very reason for our unusual - and I believe innovative – organizational design. Four of my Partners are in a special category we call Operating Partners. Each is a successful, serial entrepreneur. Each has started companies, raised venture capital, dealt with venture capital boards of directors, and despite those boards, had successful exits. They are full-time, long-term employees of our firm and members of the General Partner. The shortest tenured has been here for five years; they are not like EIRs or Venture Partners. We won’t make an investment unless one of them represents us on the Board of Directors of that company and when they do, they invest their personal capital in the Company along side the fund. They stay with that Company for the life of the investment; cradle to grave. Each is limited to no more than four boards at a time so that have the time and focus to truly assist the entrepreneur. Our whole system is about creating value over a five to eight year investment horizon, not about momentum investing. Momentum comes and goes, trends ebb and flow, markets change. But fundamental value endures.

Does this mean that the traditional VC skill-set is no longer required? Not in my opinion; it takes a myriad of skills, and resources to help a company. The classic VC skillset is alive and well. But not all VCs are created equal. And here is where I’ll diverge from Blank. I don’t think the value of a VC has anything to do with the age of the venture capitalist you select. When I look at an entrepreneur, I don’t evaluate them by age, I evaluate them by experience, wisdom and judgement. I know many 55-year-old entrepreneurs who don’t have these characteristics and a lot of 30 something entrepreneurs that do. I’ll back the wise 30-year-old entrepreneur 7 days a week and twice on Sunday. Likewise, the value of a VC has everything to do with philosophy, wisdom and judgement; and alignment with the nature of your investment opportunity.

Evaluating a VC

What I encourage entrepreneurs to do is to evaluate the VCs philosophy. Are they a momentum investor or are they a fundamental investor trying to build a real operating company? Are they interested more in the theme of your investment than in the fundamental value-creating engine of your company? Do they get caught up momentum buzzwords like web 2.0, eyeballs, mobile, etc., or are they more interested in the needs of your target customers, the vertical market you are attacking and the sustainability of your competitive advantage. Answers to these questions will shed insight on how the VC attempts to create value for their investors.

Momentum investing is inherently neither bad nor good; the same for fundamental investing. But these approaches do work differently in different exit markets. In my personal opinion, we’re in a market cycle that will disproportionately reward fundamental investors and not momentum investors. In fact, fundamental investing works great in any market. Momentum investing often outperforms in strong markets and underperforms in weak ones.

In the long-term, I believe that the fundamental approach is a better fit with entrepreneurs trying to build fundamental operating company value. It is not right for everyone; is it right for you?

Filed under: Lessons Learned, Venture Capital, , ,

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