Non-Linear Growth

A glimpse around the next corner; mind the curves.

When Expectations Converge

Yesterday, I posted on a VentureBeat piece covering the correlation between exit market conditions and venture capital company-building behaviour and philosophy; or lack thereof. The piece called for a back-to basics approach to venture capital, where investors are focused true partnering with entrepreneurs to build fundamental value over a traditional investment horizon (5-7 years).

In today’s post, I wanted to tackle the flip side of this issue; the notion that exit markets and general public equity market conditions also have an impact on venture investor investing behaviour. In my opinion, there are three things required for a healthful level of new venture investment activity; liquidity, valuation stability and convergence of expectations

Liquidity

Venture investors fundamentally sell two things; money and expertise in helping the real heros – entrepreneurs – create value. But in order to “sell” money, we have to “buy” money. By by money, I mean we have to fundraise and create a committed pool of capital to invest; a fund. If VCs can’t buy money, we can’t sell money. And right now, many VCs can’t buy money at any price. There are many reasons for this, although I won’t digress into those issues here. Suffice to say, the number of venture funds and venture capitalists is shrinking. And as funds move past their initial investment period, there is less and less liquidity in the market. In the end, this is healthy as many have made the case that the venture asset class has been over-capitalized. But regardless, if there is less capital available to venture funds, there will be less capital available to emerging growth companies.

Valuation Stability

The best proxy for valuation stability is public equity markets. Anyone who has been paying attention in the least knows we’ve had an extremely volatile twelve months. Venture investors don’t like investing in falling markets. Some refer to this as the phenomenon of “catching a falling knife”; not something you want to try, you might get cut. Point being, an investor can look “stupid” for making an investment at a valuation that is cut in half in six months by a falling public equity market. This affects the early stage less than growth and later stage deals, because there is a floor on valuation; you can’t go lower than zero. Early stage deals; particularly Series A rounds simply have less far to fall than their growth and later stage brethren. But when a business can be valued on metrics; multiples of EBITDA, revenue, subscribers, etc., as growth and later stage deals can, new investment activity comes to a screeching halt in falling markets.

The flip side often occurs in rising markets, entrepreneurs think valuations are going to continue to go up and they try to price their deals to implied future valuations as if the market were guaranteed to go up. Point being, both falling and rapidly rising public equity markets can impede new investment activity.

Convergence of Expectations

The final requirement is a convergence of valuation expectations. When markets have recently fallen, investors adjust their valuation requirements down faster than entrepreneurs. And when markets have recently risen, entrepreneurs adjust their expectations down faster than investors. After a down market, entrepreneurs may “wait it out”, refusing to come to grips with the new valuation reality. And in an overvalued or over-bought market, investors may “wait it out” waiting for the bubble to burst or a correction. Again, this applies more to growth and later stage deals than to the early stage, although all stages are affected to some degree.

So where are we now?

I don’t know, but I do have an opinion; no surprise right. I think we’re entering a period of significant deal activity. There is a low, but appropriate level of liquidity in the venture asset class. We’ve come through one of the biggest stock market corrections in history and are now up greater than 50% from the bottom on all the major market indices. Valuations are stabilizing. Entrepreneurs have had the time to adjust to the new valuation realities and investors don’t have an argument that they are either catching a falling knife or that we’re in a bubble. It all sets the tone for a reasonable and balanced valuation discussion between investors and entrepreneurs.

I for one am glad to have a new fund to invest in this environment. I think it is going to be a great time to invest and to build strong, growing and profitable operating companies that can stand-alone for years to come.

Filed under: New Investments, Risk, Venture Capital, , , ,

Cognitive Dissonance: Are you a technology or a service?

One of the trends I’ve observed over the past several years is that more and more technology entrepreneurs are starting service-delivery business.  By services businesses, I’m referring to the category of businesses that some venture investors refer to as technology-enabled services (“TES”). We at Meritage prefer the term network-enabled services (“NES”), which we think more accurately demonstrates the fundamental innovation in the business model, which is that there is a high-level of connectivity between the service delivery platform and the customer. Services is a big tent, so to ground it, put your mind on business models like SaaS, cloud computing, and even search.

Many casually refer to these businesses as “technology companies”, by which most intend Wikipedia’s definition of “information technology”, not the generic definition of “technology“. After all, these businesses create technology to build their service, right? Salesforce.com is a technology company; Yahoo! is a technology company; Akamai is a technology company …; AT&T is a technology company. Whoa! Hold it right there; rightous indignation time; I can hear it already.

AT&T is not a technology company! They don’t know the first thing about technology! AT&T is a communications services business.

So what is the difference? Why do we think of Salesforce.com as a technology company and AT&T as a service provider.

Cognitive Dissonance

Objectively, either all the companies in the list above are technology companies or none of them are. AT&T uses every bit as much technology to run its business as does Salesforce.com. And while some of that technology is different, much more of it is fundamentally the same. More importantly, the technology serves the same singular purpose; it powers the service.

So which is it? Are they all technology companies or are none of them technology companies?

Brace yourself; here comes the controversial statement. If you are a services business, you cannot be technology company. Salesforce.com is not a technology company; Akamai is not a technology company. They are service companies.

To Create of Consume

I’ll return to where I started this post; with the observation that I see many technology entrepreneurs moving into services businesses. Often times, such entrepreneurs bring with them a technology creator mindset, not a technology consumer mindset. And as a result, they are susceptible to a number of mistakes. The most common of these is when the entrepreneur convinces themselves that their proprietary technology is going to make there service provider successful. Here are three examples:

  • Wireless service provider that has invented a new technology for mesh wireless networking, enabling quality of service management for voice over wireless applications.
  • Tech-enabled service provider for eBay resellers that has invented a new web server technology that will make the technology infrastructure highly scalable.
  • SaaS developer who built its own platform for managing its application in the cloud.

What is the problem with these businesses? They are acting like creators of technology, not consumers of technology.

The rationale is that by creating a proprietary technology, the service provider can gain a competitive advantage over its service provider competitors. It is an alluring and dangerous trap. But fundamentally, there is no way the wireless service provider above can keep up with the R&D budgets of Motorolla, Qualcomm, Cisco and the like and create a best of breed mesh QoS technology in the confines of a single wireless service provider. The tech-enabled service provider can’t possibly out-compete the web server technologies on the market in the long-term.

Embedding a proprietary technology business inside a service provider decreases execution focus and greatly increases execution risk. Creating this kind of technology requires a different skill-set, different processes, and a broad market in which to distribute the product. The economics of spreading the costs of creating and maintaining a technology company like this over one, captive service provider don’t work. From an investors perspective, the Company will consume more capital than is required, trying to capture/maintain a lead in a core technology that creates only the illusion of competitive advantage for the service provider. It is hard enough to build a successful service provider. Why would you want to complicate it by having to simultaneously execute the creation and maintenance of a core technology you could purchase from a third-party vendor. And what if the science upon which the new technology is predicated upon doesn’t pan out. Then what?

Rather than invent and maintain truly proprietary core technologies, I encourage all of my service provider investments to be rational and ruthless consumers of technology, not creators of technology. Find best of breed wherever you can, configure it in a way that suits the needs of your particular service and drive your vendors, who have the R&D budgets and skills, to innovate on your behalf. It is much more capital efficient and the execution risk is significantly lower.

What I am not saying

Does this mean services businesses should not be inventive? I’m not saying that at all. In fact, the successful services businesses are highly inventive, but not at a core technology level; rather at a business process level. One of my portfolio companies, Pipeline Trading has developed some amazing algorithms around large block and algorithmic trading of equity securities. This invention is unique to Pipeline and highly proprietary. But it is not a “technology” in the information technology sense of the term, it is a business process. Sure these innovations are expressed through technology; lots of software to be precise. But that doesn’t make the innovation a technology innovation; quite the contrary. Any quality engineer who is given the advantage of understanding the business process expressed by the algorithms could easily write the software. The innovation is not the software itself, it is the algorithm; and that algorithm has fundamentally nothing to do with information technology. It turns out that the competitive advantage is also in the algorithm, not in the software that expresses it.

But, but but…

But what if we really have created an incredible technology (in the information technology sense of the term) in the process of building our service provider? What if I really do have the best cloud-enablement platform in the world. Great, you just hit the jackpot, because you’ve discovered and solved a problem that every other service provider like you will also experience. But don’t keep that innovation captive to your own little service provider; free it. Spin the business off; create a hardware, software or new service provider around the technology; open source it. In fact, this is exactly what the SaaS operator with the cloud-enablement platform did. Kudos; right call!

The highest and best use of a new technology innovation is to sell/license it to anyone and everyone who could benefit from accessing it. That includes the service providers with which you compete. If it is amazing and valuable new technology, you should be able to sell the technology to your competitors and a lot more customers. If you can’t monetize it directly, ask yourself again why you believe the technology innovation will be a source of advantage for your captive service provider?

Final thought

Where does this leave us? Well, if you are a technology entrepreneur coming into a services business, I’d suggest you first change your mindset from one of being a technology creator to a technology consumer. Whenever possible, focus on innovating at the business process level, not the core technology level. Avoid technology “research” projects and focus resources on expressing your innovative business process with software. And finally, if you are absolutely forced to solve a tough core technology problem and create a truly proprietary technology in the process, look for ways to free it from the shackles of your captive service provider. In the end, the technology will have a better chance to flourish and your service provider will be unburdened from the costs, and challenges of having to execute on two fronts simultaneously.

Don’t confuse the services business with a technology business. You can’t; and shouldn’t try to be both.

Filed under: Economics, Lessons Learned, Risk, Venture Capital, , , , , ,

The turndown with encouragement

The lot of a VC is to turn down virtually every business plan we see. The list of reasons I turn down plans is endless; the plan may a) not fit Meritage’s investment focus, b) not fit my investment interests/thesis, c) require too much capital for our firm to participate, d) be too early or too late; or perhaps I just think the investment is doomed to fail. Again, the reasons are myriad and there are too many to list here. There is, however, a small subset of plans that I would put in a unique category; the “turndown with encouragement”.

If I review your plan and I give you a turndown with encouragement, you will know it, because I will tell you that you are in this special category. What I am saying is that the answer is no, but that there is a risk in the business, that I believe could be fatal, but if mitigated, could put you on a path to wild success. If I could mitigate the risk by investing in the business, and working with you to mitigate the risk, I would not be saying no now. Rather, I’d consider the investment further and begin working with you to mitigate the risk; maybe even before closing an investment. But I’m not taking that step, because I believe the strategy for mitigating the risk is unclear.

This often confuses entrepreneurs and frequently solicits the response, “but isn’t venture capital all about taking risk.” From my perspective the answer is yes and no. Successful venture investing is about taking risks that you are comfortable with and that you believe can be mitigated. But on the flip-side, it is also about avoiding risks for which the mitigation plan is unclear. This is particularly true of risks that, if not mitigated, could deliver a fatal blow to the business.

If you get a “turndown with encouragement” from me, take it for what I mean it to be; genuine interest combined with caution. If I’m right, and you mitigate the risk, you may have your pick of venture investors, including me; and before you know it, I’ll be competing vigorously to get into your deal.

Filed under: Investment Selection, Risk, Venture Capital

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