Non-Linear Growth

A glimpse around the next corner; mind the curves.

Introducing Digital Fortress

Today, my Partners and I at Meritage Funds announced that we’ve established a new platform in the data center colocation market. Headquartered in Seattle, WA, Digital Fortress operates nearly 50,000 square feet of data center colocation space, focused on delivering high-power density installations to enterprise customers. A  Meritage Funds blog post announcing the investment has much more on our thesis and goals for the investment.

Getting this transaction done was a long an arduous process. In earnest, we began evaluating the Pacific Northwest data center market in October 2010. What we found was a fragmented market that had great supply-demand characteristics. In addition, the market has great power-dynamics, meaning that power is cheap, stable and largely from renewable sources. It blows my mind every time I cite this statistic, but over 95% of the power in metro Seattle is from renewable sources, principally because of the huge hydroelectric energy production in eastern Washington state.

It was easy to see there was a great opportunity for data center operators in the PNW. But, finding an entry point into the market was a bear. Because the market is fragmented, there was no natural starting point. Rather than buying a platform, we would have to create one. In the end, we made that happen by completing the simultaneous acquisitions of two data center operators that happened to be located in the same building. In concept that sounds easy. From first hand experience, I can tell you it was really hard. There were an incredible number of moving parts here, including simultaneous negotiation, documentation and diligence processes on both acquisitions, a debt syndication, an equity syndication, and most importantly, the establishment of a new management team which has the chops to achieve our goals for the investment. In all, executing the transaction took the better part of ten months.

In the end, it was worth it. Overnight, Digital Fortress has become the leading independent colocation provider in its market. We’ve established a strong leadership team with the addition of Mark Hughes (former EVP of Operations at SunGard) as Executive Chairman and Tim Doherty (former CEO of Fortress Colocation) as Chief Corporate Development Officer. Already, the Company is executing its expansion plan with the announcement of a new facility in downtown Seattle. With our equity partners, Halyard Capital and Sweetwater Capital, we have dry powder to fund further organic and acquisition-based expansion plans.

If you believe that the hard things are the most rewarding, then our investment in Digital Fortress is sure to be a success.

For my friends in Seattle, please let me know how Digital Fortress can be a resource to you in your market.

Filed under: Growth Equity, Investment Selection, New Investments, , , , ,

Finding the Proverbial Pony

Tech people use the phrase “there is a pony in here somewhere” to describe a tough situation where there is a hidden big opportunity. I hear it most often in the context of a stagnating business that can’t seem to break-out and needs a new catalyst for growth. For example, in businesses that need to make a pivot (btw, the most overused word of 2010/2011 in my mind).

I like the idea behind finding the pony, although not the specific phrase for reasons made clear below. Which leaves a very important question: How do you find the pony? I recommend the following process:

1) Deconstruct Your Assets/Capabilities/Resources: Pull every part of your company, organization, product and systems apart. Absolutely deconstruct each of these parts of the business into their smallest base elements.

2) Get Out of the Office: Plan a day out of the office with no agenda and nothing more than a white-board and the list of your assets/capabilities/resources. Bring in the most creative people you can find from within and outside of your company. Bring in people from spaces that are on the periphery to the space in which you current operate. You want to avoid groupthink so a diversity of backgrounds is better.

3) Evaluate Each Element: As a group, evaluate each of the elements you have isolated. Focus on the raw component parts of your existing product. One of those base elements might be the nugget of a big idea, but was too buried in a system view of your product for you to see it. Also focus your time on elements that are nearest in proximity to revenue streams. That is to say, focus on elements that enable other companies to generate revenue, as opposed to those that will require you to be a vendor selling a back-office product at a “cost”. Prioritize your top ideas.

4) Groups: Break-up into groups, assigning each two ideas. Make sure there is overlap, so that at least two groups cover each idea. Assign each group to come back with a back of the napkin business plan idea for the high priority components you have identified.

5) Research: Take the best ideas and work them.

This exercise won’t automagically generate a whole product or write the business plan, but it might lead you down the right path.

An Aside:

So why don’t I like the phrase? Well, the genesis of the phase “there is a pony in here somewhere” is a joke. It goes something like this:

Once upon a time, there was a mom and dad that had two children. One of them was an optimist, the other a pessimist.   Wanting to understand why the two children were so different, they consulted a psychiatrist, who set up an experiment to help figure it out. The psychiatrist led the first child into a room that was full of brand new toys. Immediately the child burst into tears.   The psychiatrist asked why, and the child replied “all of these toys are new, and if I start playing with them I’m afraid I might break one.”   Obviously, this was the pessimist. So the psychiatrist led the other to a room that was full of horse manure. The child immediately dove in, scooping out handfuls of the disgusting stuff.   The psychiatrist asked why the child was doing that, he replied “with all this horse manure, there has to be a pony around here somewhere, and I’m gonna find it.”

I don’t know about you, but I’d much rather polish a diamond in the rough than find the pony.

Filed under: Random, , , ,

Cognitive Dissonance: Are you a technology or a service?

One of the trends I’ve observed over the past several years is that more and more technology entrepreneurs are starting service-delivery business.  By services businesses, I’m referring to the category of businesses that some venture investors refer to as technology-enabled services (“TES”). We at Meritage prefer the term network-enabled services (“NES”), which we think more accurately demonstrates the fundamental innovation in the business model, which is that there is a high-level of connectivity between the service delivery platform and the customer. Services is a big tent, so to ground it, put your mind on business models like SaaS, cloud computing, and even search.

Many casually refer to these businesses as “technology companies”, by which most intend Wikipedia’s definition of “information technology”, not the generic definition of “technology“. After all, these businesses create technology to build their service, right? Salesforce.com is a technology company; Yahoo! is a technology company; Akamai is a technology company …; AT&T is a technology company. Whoa! Hold it right there; rightous indignation time; I can hear it already.

AT&T is not a technology company! They don’t know the first thing about technology! AT&T is a communications services business.

So what is the difference? Why do we think of Salesforce.com as a technology company and AT&T as a service provider.

Cognitive Dissonance

Objectively, either all the companies in the list above are technology companies or none of them are. AT&T uses every bit as much technology to run its business as does Salesforce.com. And while some of that technology is different, much more of it is fundamentally the same. More importantly, the technology serves the same singular purpose; it powers the service.

So which is it? Are they all technology companies or are none of them technology companies?

Brace yourself; here comes the controversial statement. If you are a services business, you cannot be technology company. Salesforce.com is not a technology company; Akamai is not a technology company. They are service companies.

To Create of Consume

I’ll return to where I started this post; with the observation that I see many technology entrepreneurs moving into services businesses. Often times, such entrepreneurs bring with them a technology creator mindset, not a technology consumer mindset. And as a result, they are susceptible to a number of mistakes. The most common of these is when the entrepreneur convinces themselves that their proprietary technology is going to make there service provider successful. Here are three examples:

  • Wireless service provider that has invented a new technology for mesh wireless networking, enabling quality of service management for voice over wireless applications.
  • Tech-enabled service provider for eBay resellers that has invented a new web server technology that will make the technology infrastructure highly scalable.
  • SaaS developer who built its own platform for managing its application in the cloud.

What is the problem with these businesses? They are acting like creators of technology, not consumers of technology.

The rationale is that by creating a proprietary technology, the service provider can gain a competitive advantage over its service provider competitors. It is an alluring and dangerous trap. But fundamentally, there is no way the wireless service provider above can keep up with the R&D budgets of Motorolla, Qualcomm, Cisco and the like and create a best of breed mesh QoS technology in the confines of a single wireless service provider. The tech-enabled service provider can’t possibly out-compete the web server technologies on the market in the long-term.

Embedding a proprietary technology business inside a service provider decreases execution focus and greatly increases execution risk. Creating this kind of technology requires a different skill-set, different processes, and a broad market in which to distribute the product. The economics of spreading the costs of creating and maintaining a technology company like this over one, captive service provider don’t work. From an investors perspective, the Company will consume more capital than is required, trying to capture/maintain a lead in a core technology that creates only the illusion of competitive advantage for the service provider. It is hard enough to build a successful service provider. Why would you want to complicate it by having to simultaneously execute the creation and maintenance of a core technology you could purchase from a third-party vendor. And what if the science upon which the new technology is predicated upon doesn’t pan out. Then what?

Rather than invent and maintain truly proprietary core technologies, I encourage all of my service provider investments to be rational and ruthless consumers of technology, not creators of technology. Find best of breed wherever you can, configure it in a way that suits the needs of your particular service and drive your vendors, who have the R&D budgets and skills, to innovate on your behalf. It is much more capital efficient and the execution risk is significantly lower.

What I am not saying

Does this mean services businesses should not be inventive? I’m not saying that at all. In fact, the successful services businesses are highly inventive, but not at a core technology level; rather at a business process level. One of my portfolio companies, Pipeline Trading has developed some amazing algorithms around large block and algorithmic trading of equity securities. This invention is unique to Pipeline and highly proprietary. But it is not a “technology” in the information technology sense of the term, it is a business process. Sure these innovations are expressed through technology; lots of software to be precise. But that doesn’t make the innovation a technology innovation; quite the contrary. Any quality engineer who is given the advantage of understanding the business process expressed by the algorithms could easily write the software. The innovation is not the software itself, it is the algorithm; and that algorithm has fundamentally nothing to do with information technology. It turns out that the competitive advantage is also in the algorithm, not in the software that expresses it.

But, but but…

But what if we really have created an incredible technology (in the information technology sense of the term) in the process of building our service provider? What if I really do have the best cloud-enablement platform in the world. Great, you just hit the jackpot, because you’ve discovered and solved a problem that every other service provider like you will also experience. But don’t keep that innovation captive to your own little service provider; free it. Spin the business off; create a hardware, software or new service provider around the technology; open source it. In fact, this is exactly what the SaaS operator with the cloud-enablement platform did. Kudos; right call!

The highest and best use of a new technology innovation is to sell/license it to anyone and everyone who could benefit from accessing it. That includes the service providers with which you compete. If it is amazing and valuable new technology, you should be able to sell the technology to your competitors and a lot more customers. If you can’t monetize it directly, ask yourself again why you believe the technology innovation will be a source of advantage for your captive service provider?

Final thought

Where does this leave us? Well, if you are a technology entrepreneur coming into a services business, I’d suggest you first change your mindset from one of being a technology creator to a technology consumer. Whenever possible, focus on innovating at the business process level, not the core technology level. Avoid technology “research” projects and focus resources on expressing your innovative business process with software. And finally, if you are absolutely forced to solve a tough core technology problem and create a truly proprietary technology in the process, look for ways to free it from the shackles of your captive service provider. In the end, the technology will have a better chance to flourish and your service provider will be unburdened from the costs, and challenges of having to execute on two fronts simultaneously.

Don’t confuse the services business with a technology business. You can’t; and shouldn’t try to be both.

Filed under: Economics, Lessons Learned, Risk, Venture Capital, , , , , ,

The future is in services

Last week, I attended GigaOm’s Structure ’09 Conference: Put Cloud Computing to Work. It was worthwhile to attend and I intend to return next year. It was exciting to see how the services business model is being rapidly adopted by the technology-delivery value-chain.

In a talk titled The Cloud in Context, Russ Daniels, VP and CTO of Cloud Services Strategy at HP put it most succinctly, describing HP’s vision as:

“Everything is a Service”.

Full video of Daniels’ talk here. While the “everything is a service” mantra is almost certainly overreaching, it drives home an undeniable point; the action is in services. To make it fully, I think you have to start with the view from the customer’s perspective. What the customer wants is functionality that helps them achieve a business objective delivered at a total cost of ownership that is less than the value they can extract from the functionality. Issues of security and control aside for a moment, the customer is mercenary about this and will adopt the delivery method that gives them the functionality they want with the best ROI. Said another way, customers are becoming delivery-model agnostic.

It is no wonder then that the operating model through which value is delivered to customers (whether enterprise, smb or consumer) is turning away from products and toward services. It is well documented that in many cases, the services model has an ROI advantage over the product model. At a macro level, I tend to frame the transformation technology markets are undergoing as one where products are turning into services.

Products turning into services

Consider the transformation taking place in each of the following areas:

Value Proposition Product Delivery Model Services Delivery Model
Application level functionality Shrink-wrapped Software Software as a Service
Data storage Hardware Storage as a Service
Computing power/Processing Web Servers Computing as a Service

In each case, the value proposition – once delivered to the customer in the form of a one-time sale/license product – can now be accessed by the customer through a CapEx light service. Customers are dropping the CapEx and OpEx associated with managing IT infrastructure for pure OpEx in the form of services.

An Investors View

While technology plays a key role in enabling the trend toward services, the trend itself is not fundamentally about technology. Rather, the opportunity offered by the cloud is a more efficient operating model; the service operating model. This creates a new layer to the technology value chain; the services layer. Any time a new layer is added to a value chain, new investment opportunities are created and pre-existing layers of the value chain are at risk. From a venture investor’s point of view, this forces a rethinking of investment approaches.

An ecosystem play

The new investment opportunities in the cloud go way beyond the traditional IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS layers of the stack, although there are opportunities within each of those categories. Each of these layers will require its own support ecosystem to achieve its full potential. These are often referred to as enablers. Enablers are interesting investment opportunities, because they enable the investor to play the momentum of a category. For example, an investment in a SaaS enabler that provides billing, operating support and other capabilities to SaaS developers is a play on the success of SaaS as a category as opposed to any one SaaS operator. If the category you “enable” fails, like the mobile virtual network operator category, your enabler will fail, like the mobile virtual network enablers failed. But if the category you are enabling is successful, the rising tide is likely to lift your boat too, so long as you have a valuable service.

Existing value chain is threatened

The emergence of the service layer is facilitated by massive improvements in networking, computing, storage and software, including virtualization. What is ironic is that the emergence of the services layer threatens the very same product vendors that have facilitated its development. In the product oriented technology value chain, product vendors (software, storage, computing) sold to end users; enterprises, small businesses and consumers. In a services oriented value chain, these same product vendors sell to the service providers (IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS). For an investor there are two implications. The first is that those product companies just lost access to the end customer, replaced by the relationship between the service provider and the customer. The second implication is less obvious, but more threatening. The services business is a business of economies of scale. It requires a significant up-front investment in service delivery infrastructure, but has very low margin costs for each new customer added. The result is that sub-scale service operators can’t compete; and the big get bigger. This tends to restult in a concentrated service provider market, consolidating buying power, which squeezes margins of  the suppliers to the service providers. Those of us who have roots in the services sectors understand this phenomenon quite well. We have a saying at Meritage about the communications equipment space that I’ve grown fond of; “there are too many vendors and not enough customers”. This is one of the many reasons we don’t invest in communications equipment, but we love the communications services landscape.

The point is, if I were a product company focused on selling software, storage, or computing, I’d be frightened right now because my sales model is going to change dramatically over the coming ten years and not in my favor. The “On the Shoulders of Giants” panel at Structure really drove this message home. The panel, moderated by Jonathan Heiliger of Facebook, included ops leaders from Microsoft, MySpace, Google, Yahoo! And LinkedIn. These guys push their vendors hard. Heck, Google designs its own hardware and considers it a competitive advantage. Product vendors can expect more of the same treatment with the emergence of big cloud services operators like Amazon, Salesforce.com and others.

It is no wonder then that every major product vendor, from SAP to EMC is stuck in a seemingly bipolar tug of war between their legacy product businesses and their emerging attempts to run services platforms. Unfortunately, the key success factors for running a product-oriented company don’t translate well into a services environment.

Implications for Venture Capital

Participants in the technology supply chain aren’t the only ones struggling with the implications of the cloud’s emergence. The venture community is as well. It turns out that investing in services businesses demands a different skillset and philosophy than investing in product companies.

Because most services businesses go to market with a recurring revenue business model, the economics of the business are much harder to evaluate and the profitability is back-end loaded. In a prior post, I wrote about The economics of on-demand services, which includes an evaluation of unit factors like ARPU, churn, service delivery costs, etc. This is sufficiently more complicated than the economics of hardware; sell a unit, collect the revenue and lock in your gross margin on the sale.

The net result is that services businesses can be quite capital intensive, even if the market responds well to the service. It is more capital efficient than was the case when you had to build your own network to deliver a service (think cable), but still more capital intensive than product investing. As a result, investing in services is not for the faint of heart. Early indicators of success that are so prevalent in the product world are harder to come identify, except with an expert eye. It takes a tremendous amount of patience and in some cases stubborn conviction to be successful in services investing.

The opportunity for investors in the cloud is real, but only for those with an appropriate long-term company building philosophy and a level of comfort with the services business model.

Filed under: Cloud, Conferences, Themes, Venture Capital, , , , , , ,

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